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In July 2013, as part of a four-week summer session at the University of 
Delaware’s Osher Lifelong Learning Institute, I presented a series of lectures 
for non-lawyer senior citizens on things every American should know about 
the U.S. Constitution.  Most of the topics were drawn from then-current 
headlines, such as the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on marriage 
equality1 and the relationship between the Fifteenth Amendment and the 
Voting Rights Act.2  In addition to these traditional Constitutional Law 
subjects, I decided to include a topic not normally covered at the law school: 
                                                 
 + Professor of Law, Widener Law Delaware. B.A., Yale (History); J.D., Cornell.  This Article is 
dedicated to the memory of my father, the Hon. Joseph F. McManamon.  I am grateful for the 
research assistance of Widener Law Delaware librarians Mary Alice Peeling, Janet Lindenmuth, 
and Enza Klotzbucher. 
 1. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659–60 (2013) (addressing marriage 
equality in the context of California’s Proposition 8); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2683–84 (2013) (applying a Fifth Amendment equal protection analysis to marriage equality in 
the context of the federal Defense of Marriage Act).  Both cases were less than a month old in 
July 2013. 
 2. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013) (analyzing the 
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act).  This case was decided less than a month before July 
2013. 
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the Natural Born Citizen Clause of Article II (“the Clause”).3  The members of 
the class were old enough to remember Mexican-born George Romney’s 1968 
presidential run;4 Canal Zone-born John McCain’s run in 2008 was recent 
history;5 and at the time, Canadian-born Ted Cruz was hinting at a run in 
2016.6 
As I researched the Clause, it quickly became clear to me that most modern 
scholars had made virtually no attempt to wrestle with the text of the 
Constitution7 and their historical analyses were negligent at best.  Ironically, 
most of these commentaries were created by authors purporting to explain the 
meaning of the Clause in the context of the time in which it was written.8  One 
refreshingly honest author declared: 
The “natural born citizen” requirement manifests a distrust of the 
foreign-born that, in a nation of immigrants, can only be derided as 
repugnant. I both “reject” it and I “denounce” it! It’s still part of the 
Constitution, however, and therefore we need to try to figure out 
what it means. My frankly normative move would be to limit the 
damage by limiting the scope of “foreign-born.” There’s no plausible 
way to read the provision to permit [Austrian-born former California 
Governor Arnold] Schwarzenegger and other naturalized citizens to 
become President. There is a ready (if not 100% clearly the original) 
way to read it to permit Americans born abroad to U.S. parents to 
become citizens.9 
                                                 
 3. “No Person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall be eligible to the Office of the 
President . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.  The Clause also provides that persons naturalized 
before the Constitution’s adoption were eligible.  Id.  Of course, no one fitting that description is 
alive today. 
 4. See Mark Memmot, Why Could Romney’s Father Run for President if He Was Born in 
Mexico?, NPR (Jan. 27, 2012, 1:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/01/27/1459 
87534/why-could-romneys-father-run-for-president-if-he-was-born-in-mexico (discussing the 
legal concerns and justifications surrounding Governor Romney’s candidacy). 
 5. See Carl Hulse, McCain’s Canal Zone Birth Prompts Queries About Whether that Rules 
Him Out, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/us/politics/ 
28mccain.html?fta=y (presenting both sides of the legal debate concerning McCain’s candidacy). 
 6. Mark Hanrahan, Ted Cruz 2016 Presidential Bid Looks Likely, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 
31, 2014, 12:38 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ted-cruz-2016-presidential-bid-looks-likely-
1674558.  That hint became a reality on March 23, 2015, when Senator Cruz announced his 
candidacy for the presidency.  See Nick Corasaniti and Patrick Healy, Ted Cruz Becomes First 
Major Candidate to Announce Presidential Bid for 2016, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/us/politics/ted-cruz-2016-presidential-race.html?_r=0.  
 7. E.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 22, 25–30 (2008) (relying largely on a secondary source instead of the Clause’s 
language). 
 8. See, e.g., id. at 26–30 (examining the original understanding of “natural born” by 
introducing English law and commentaries). 
 9. Michael C. Dorf, Originalism Versus Straight Talk, DORF ON LAW (Feb. 29, 2008, 
1:21 PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2008/02/originalism-versus-straight-talk.html.  The author’s 
idea was as follows: “The best reading–-although not necessarily the original understanding–-
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Unfortunately, that approach is a bit too cavalier for me.  Even though I 
believe the U.S. Constitution has evolved over time, I still think that, in order 
to answer questions about its meaning, one should begin with its text and 
history. Thus, this Article explains how the Clause would have been 
understood in the early days of the Republic. Whether this historical 
interpretation should be disregarded to meet the changing sensibilities of 
modern Americans is beyond the Article’s scope. 
A presidential hopeful may encounter several issues involving the meaning 
of “natural born citizen.”  For example, does someone born to alien parents in 
the United States qualify?  Or should children born in the incorporated 
territories of the United Statessuch as Kansas and Arizona formerly 
were10receive the same treatment as those born in unincorporated territories 
of the United States–such as the Philippines and the Canal Zone once were?11  
However, this Article is not a comprehensive treatment of all questions 
presented by the Clause.  It only addresses the question raised by the 
candidacies of Governor Romney and Senator Cruz: in the eyes of early 
Americans, would someone born to American parents in a foreign country be a 
“natural born citizen” and therefore eligible to be a U.S. President? 
Because the phrase “natural born” was derived from the common law, this 
Article begins with an examination of pertinent English sources, which would 
have been known to the Framers of the Constitution.  This Article then reveals 
early Americans’ understanding of the phrase, beginning with the drafting of 
the Constitution,12 including ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,13 and 
ending with the Supreme Court’s 1898 confirmation that birth in the United 
States is the key to being “natural born.”14  This discussion necessarily 
                                                                                                                 
would be to say that anybody who was a citizen at birth (whether because born in the U.S. or 
because born to U.S. parents overseas), should qualify as ‘natural born.’”  Michael C. Dorf, 
Alexander Hamilton Was Eligible to be President, DORF ON LAW (Feb. 28, 2008, 4:10 PM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2008/02/alexander-hamilton-was-eligible-to-be.html. 
 10. Richard E. Berg-Andersson, Official Name and Status History of the Several States and 
U.S. Territories, GREEN PAPERS (Aug. 22, 2001), http://www.thegreenpapers.com/slg/ 
explanation-statehood.phtml.  Incorporated territories formed an integral part of the United States, 
although they were not yet states.  Id. 
 11. Originally, all unincorporated territories were possessions overseas.  Id.  The United 
States did not have such territories until the mid-nineteenth century, and most were obtained as a 
result of the Spanish-American War.  Id.  The United States currently maintains five inhabited 
unincorporated territories: American Samoa, Guam, Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands.  Id. 
 12. The Constitution was drafted in 1787.  Constitution of the United States, CHARTERS 
FREEDOM, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution.html (last visited Nov. 23, 
2014). 
 13. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. Primary Documents in American 
History: 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr/ 
program/bib/ourdocs/14thamendment.html (last updated Sept. 24, 2014). 
 14. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898) (recognizing citizenship 
of a child born in the United States to foreign born parents). 
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includes the import of the earliest naturalization statutes.  Finally, the Article 
reveals the weaknesses of modern commentary on the original meaning of the 
Clause. 
I.  THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE IN ENGLAND 
The U.S. Constitution contains many phrases from the common law,15 such 
as “ex post facto,” “writ of habeas corpus,” “bill of attainder,” and “natural 
born citizen.”16  However, unlike modern statutes, the Constitution does not 
contain a section entitled “Definitions.”  The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
faced challenges presented by this silence and declared that our paramount law 
“must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history 
of which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution.”17  So, it is 
to the common law that one must first look to determine the meaning of 
“natural born citizen.” 
A.  Common Law Significance of “Natural Born” 
English common law was absolute as to the definition of “natural born.”18  
Sir William Blackstone stated: 
The first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and 
natural-born subjects. Natural-born subjects are such as are born 
within the dominions of the crown of England, that is, within the 
ligeance, or as it is generally called, the allegiance of the king; and 
aliens, such as are born out of it.19 
Although birth within English territory was generally a good indicator of 
whether a child was within the ligeance of the crown,20 the two concepts were 
not co-extensive.  To be exact, an alien was not one born “out of the realme, 
                                                 
 15. Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270, 274 (1875) (stating that the Constitution’s 
language derives from the common law). 
 16. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 2, 3 (utilizing such terms in clauses relating to 
immigration and migration). 
 17. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 654 (declaring U.S. common law indistinct from English 
common law); accord, e.g., Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888); Moore, 91 U.S. at 274; 
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167 (1874) (verifying that the framers were conscious of 
common law language); Charles Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The 
Unresolved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1968) (noting that the framers also retained English 
tradition and culture, in addition to legal wording).  See also Carmel v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521 
(2000) (looking to English common law to define “ex post facto laws”). 
 18. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 354 (Oxford, 
The Clarendon Press 1765); accord, e.g., 1 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
421–22 (London, A. Strahan 1822) (discussing the scope and rights afforded by allegiance). 
 19. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 354. 
 20. ALEXANDER COCKBURN, NATIONALITY: OR THE LAW RELATING TO SUBJECTS AND 
ALIENS, CONSIDERED WITH A VIEW TO FUTURE LEGISLATION 7 (London, William Ridgway 
1869) (declaring almost all persons, regardless of parentage, born within English borders to be 
subjects of the king). 
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but out of the liegeance; for he may be borne out of the realme of England, yet 
within the liegeance.”21 
Two corollaries arose based on this distinction.  First, “the children of the 
king’s embassadors born abroad were always held to be natural subjects.”22  
Second, children born to members of a hostile occupying force were born in 
the allegiance of the sovereign to whom the force belonged.23  Likewise, 
children born in English territory while the monarch “was out of actual 
possession thereof” were not the king’s subjects.24  This approach is referred to 
as jus soli or the “right of the soil.”25 
The common law notion of allegiance was derived from the “feodal system” 
of England’s “Gothic ancestors” and promoted the idea that “[a]llegiance is the 
tie, or ligamen, which binds the subject to the king, in return for that protection 
which the king affords the subject.”26  Blackstone explained the importance of 
this governing principle thus: “For, immediately upon their birth, they are 
under the king’s protection; at a time too, when (during their infancy) they are 
incapable of protecting themselves. Natural allegiance is therefore a debt of 
gratitude; which cannot be forfeited . . . .”27 
In the vast majority of cases, someone born outside of English territory was 
an alien.28  Consequently, English sources routinely described aliens as those 
born “beyond the seas” or “in foreign parts.”29  Therefore, this Article uses that 
terminology unless one of the corollaries is applicable. 
                                                 
 21. 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 129a (Philadelphia, Robert 
H. Small 1853) [hereinafter COKE, INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND]; accord, e.g., COMYNS, supra note 
18, at 421 (explaining that allegiance to the king begins at birth, but can be acquired upon 
naturalization). 
 22. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 361; accord, e.g., Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 
377 (K.B.) 399; 7 Co. Rep. 1 a, 18 b.  See also COCKBURN, supra note 20, at 7. 
 23. Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.) 399, 7 Co. Rep. 1 a, 18 b, COCKBURN, 
supra note 20, at 7. 
 24. Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.) 399, 7 Co. Rep. 1 a, 18 b, accord, e.g., 
COMYNS, supra note 18, at 421. 
 25. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 994 (10th ed. 2014).  A different approach, known as jus 
sanguinis (“right of blood”), id., determines a child’s citizenship by the citizenship of his or her 
parents.  Gordon, supra note 17, at 6.  Many European countries followed this approach.  Id.  In 
the eighteenth century, however, England adopted a limited version of jus sanguinis.  See infra 
notes 67–76 and accompanying text (detailing how the law restricted jus sanguinis to only one 
generation). 
 26. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 354. 
 27. Id. at 357. 
 28. Id. at 354 (differentiating aliens from English subjects). 
 29. E.g., 18 THE HUGUENOT SOC’Y OF LONDON, LETTERS OF DENIZATION AND ACTS OF 
NATURALIZATION FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND, 16031700, at 54 (William A. Shaw 
ed., 1911) [hereinafter SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS] (listing all aliens 
naturalized in the seventeenth century and the reasons for the naturalizations). 
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Records indicate that as early as 1437, aliens began to become naturalized, 
but that process could only occur through a private act of Parliament.30  
However, “naturalization under . . . a private bill could cost £50 or £60,”31 
“which limited naturalization to the wealthy.”32  To put this amount in 
perspective, 
[d]uring the eighteenth century wages could be as low as two or three 
pounds per year for a domestic servant, plus food, lodging and 
clothing. . . . Because [independent artisans] had to provide their own 
food, lodging and clothing, [they] needed to earn substantially more 
than this. . . . [A] figure closer to £40 [per year] was needed to keep a 
family.33 
Despite the expense, “[c]hildren of Englishmen born abroad usually opted 
for naturalization.”34  For example, in 1553, Gersone and Barnabas Hylles, 
sons of British citizens Richard and Agnes, were naturalized.35  Likewise, in 
1576, Joseph Caunte, son of Edward and Margaret, both English, was 
naturalized.36 -Again, in 1610, Margaret Clarke, daughter of John and 
Elizabeth Langton, both English, was naturalized.37  Moreover, in 1660, 
                                                 
 30. Aliens and Immigrants in England and Wales, FAMILYSEARCH, https://familysearc.org/ 
learn/wiki/en/Aliens_and_Immigrants_in_England_and_Wales (last updated Sept. 11, 2011) 
[hereinafter Aliens and Immigrants].  See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 362 (detailing the 
naturalization process); COCKBURN, supra note 20, at 28 (exploring the differences between 
naturalization and denization).  Another category of people, called “denizens,” were aliens who 
received letters patent by the king that afforded them certain citizenship rights.  BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 18, at 362; COKE, INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, supra note 21, at § 129a.  According to 
one source, “On the whole, foreigners opted for denization because it was cheaper[, even though 
it was] not retrospective and it did not allow one to hold public office.”  Aliens and Immigrants, 
supra.  For a more detailed explanation of the differences between naturalization and denization, 
including tax rates, see SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS, supra note 29, at iiiviii.  
The denizen did not survive the American Revolution; thus, that discussion exceeds the scope of 
this Article. 
 31. ROBIN D. GWINN, HUGUENOT HERITAGE: THE HISTORY AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE 
HUGUENOTS IN BRITAIN 153 (rev. 2d ed. 2001). 
 32. United Kingdom Naturalization and Citizenship, FAMILYSEARCH, https://familysearch. 
org/learn/wiki/en/United_Kingdom_Naturalization_and_Citizenship (last updated Aug. 13, 2014) 
(exploring pre-1844 naturalization); accord, e.g., GWINN, supra note 31. 
 33. Currency, Coinage and the Cost of Living, OLD BAILEY ONLINE, www.oldbaileyonline. 
org/static/Coinage.jsp (last updated Apr. 2013). 
 34. That is, as opposed to denization.  See Aliens and Immigrants, supra note 30; accord 
THE HUGUENOT SOC’Y OF LONDON, LETTERS OF DENIZATION AND ACTS OF NATURALIZATION 
FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND, 15091603, at i (Lymington, Chas T. King 1893) [hereinafter 
SIXTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS].  See also supra note 30 (providing a definition of 
“denizen”). 
 35. SIXTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS, supra note 34, at 124; see infra App., at Part 
I. 
 36. SIXTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS, supra note 34, at 44; see infra App., at Part I. 
 37. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS, supra note 29, at 15; see infra App., at 
Part II. 
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Constant, Nathaniell, Joshua, and Giles Sylvester, children of Giles and Mary, 
both English, were naturalized.38  Additionally, in 1701, Archibald Arthur, son 
of English parents, was naturalized.39 
One important distinction between natural born subjects and aliens was that 
the latter were barred from inheriting real estate.40  This disability significantly 
hindered natural born merchants who traveled the world to bring goods and 
money back to England, but who could not pass their full estate to any of their 
children born beyond the seas.41  Therefore, to encourage foreign commerce, 
Parliament passed a statute in 1350 providing that 
all children [which from henceforth shall be] born abroad, provided 
both their parents were at the time of the birth in allegiance to the 
king, and the mother had passed the seas by her husband’s consent, 
might inherit as if born in England: and accordingly it hath been so 
adjudged in behalf of merchants.42 
This statute was prospective only43 and did not change the fundamental 
common law rule that children born overseas were aliens.44  This principle 
                                                 
 38. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS, supra note 29, at 79; see infra App., at 
Part II. 
 39. 27 THE HUGUENOT SOC’Y OF LONDON, LETTERS OF DENIZATION AND ACTS OF 
NATURALIZATION FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND, 17011800, at 1 (William A. Shaw 
ed., 1923); see infra App., at Part III.  The preceding examples represent just a few of the children 
born abroad to English subjects who became naturalized.  See infra, App. 
 40. COCKBURN, supra note 20, at 143 (exploring real estate rights of aliens in England); 
COKE, INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, supra note 21, at § 8a (detailing the rights of heirs of 
Englishmen).  See, e.g., Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.) 399, 7 Co. Rep. 1 a, 18 b 
(stating that “an alien born is not capable of inheritance within England”). 
 41. See, e.g., Bacon v. Bacon, (1791) 79 Eng. Rep. 1117 (K.B.) 1118, Cro. Car. 602, 602 
(declaring a merchant’s daughter an heir after her property was seized and she was arrested on 
grounds of trespassing, based on her mother’s alien status). 
 42. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 361 (footnote omitted).  The act referred to is A Statute 
for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea, 1350, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 1, reprinted in 1 STATUTES 
OF THE REALM 310 (1801).  See also Statute Made at Westminster on the First Day of May in the 
Forty-Second Year of King Edward III, 1368, 42 Edw. 3, stat. 3 (confirming that children born in 
the king’s lands and seignories “beyond the Sea” may inherit), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE 
REALM 389 (1801); cf. An Act to Enable His Majesties Naturall Borne Subjects To Inherite the 
Estate of Their Ancestors Either Lineall or Collaterall Notwithstanding Their Father or Mother 
Were Aliens, 1699, 11 Will. 3, c. 6 (allowing natural born subjects to inherit from alien 
ancestors), reprinted in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 590 (1820). 
 43. COCKBURN, supra note 20, at 9 (recounting the comparisons between the statute and the 
common law).  It has been suggested that the 1350 statute was declaratory of the common law; 
that is, alien children of natural born subjects could inherit under the common law.  E.g., Bacon v. 
Bacon, (1791) 79 Eng. Rep. 1117 (K.B.) 1118, Cro. Car. 602, 602 (awarding denizen status to the 
daughter of a merchant for purposes of inheritance but refusing to grant her citizenship); but see, 
e.g., id. (highlighting one judge’s insistence that inheritance was allowed because of the statute).  
However, this assertion appears “to have been derived, immediately or ultimately, from one or the 
other of . . . two sources.”  United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 669 (1898).  The first 
source is dicta by Sir William Hussey, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, noting that children 
born abroad to English subjects inherited property under the common law, and the 1350 statute 
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always remained the default rule.  Thus, when, a mere three decades after the 
1350 statute’s passage, Parliament enacted a law requiring most people to 
obtain a special license from the king before leaving England,45 the new statute 
was interpreted against the backdrop of the common law.46  If English subjects 
went “beyond sea without licence, or tarr[ied] there after the time limited by 
the licence, and ha[d] issue, . . . the issue [wa]s an alien, and not inheritable.”47 
Furthermore, the 1350 statute referred only to “children inheritors”; they 
were not thereby made subjects.48  Given the feudal roots of the “natural born 
subject” concept,49 it would have made no sense to declare that a child could 
                                                                                                                 
makes that clear, “mes le Statut fait cler.”  Y.B. 1 Rich. 3, fol. 4a, Mich., pl. 7 (1483) (Eng.), 
reprinted in 11 SELDEN SOCIETY 4 (2007).  But as Sir Alexander Cockburn, Chief Justice of the 
Queen’s Bench and first Lord Chief Justice of England, declared, “this view is hardly consistent 
with its language, which . . . refers only to children which ‘from henceforth shall be born;’ and . . 
. if the statute had only been declaratory of the Common law, the subsequent legislation on this 
subject would have been wholly unnecessary.”  COCKBURN, supra note 20, at 9.  The second 
source is 
a note added to the edition of 1688 of Dyer’s Reports, . . . which has been shown, by a 
search of the roll in the King’s Bench so referred to, to be a mistake, . . . as the child 
there in question did not appear to have been born beyond sea. 
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 669–70. 
 44. “The common law . . . stood absolutely so; with only a very few exceptions: so that a 
particular act of parliament became necessary after the restoration, for the naturalization of 
children of his majesty’s English subjects, born in foreign countries during the late troubles.”  
BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 361.  The statute that mandated “particular acts” from Parliament 
for naturalization was enacted in 1677 and is discussed at infra note 58.  The only “exception[ ]” 
mentioned by Blackstone is the corollary concerning children of ambassadors, discussed in the 
text accompanying supra notes 21–22. 
 45. 5 Ric. 2, stat. 1, c. 2 (1381) (U.K.).  The following were exempted from the 
requirement: “the Lords and other Great Men of the Realm, and true and notable Merchants, and 
the King’s soldiers.”  Id.  This statute was repealed after more than two centuries by An Act for 
the Utter Abolicion of All Memory of Hostilitie and the Dependances Thereof Betweene England 
and Scotland and for the Repressinge of Occasions of Discord and Disorders in Tyme to Come, 4 
Jac. 1, c. 1, § 4 (1606). 
 46. See, e.g., Hyde v. Hill, (1582), 78 Eng. Rep. 270 (K.B.) 270, 7 Co. Rep. 18, 18 (refusing 
to adopt Sir William Hussey’s dicta opinion). 
 47. Id.  The report notes that it is “contrary to the opinion of Hussey, 1 Ric. 3. pl. 4.”  Id.  
For a discussion of Hussey’s opinion and its weaknesses, see supra note 43. 
 48. COCKBURN, supra note 20, at 9.  In Doe v. Jones, (1791), 100 Eng. Rep. 1031 (K.B.) 
1035, 4 T.R. 301, 308, however, Lord Kenyon, Lord Chief Justice, noted in dicta, “I cannot 
conceive that the Legislature in passing that Act meant to stop short in conferring the right of 
inheritance merely on such children, but that they intended to confer on them all the rights of 
natural-born subjects.”  Despite this suggestion, the interpretation of Sir Alexander Cockburn, 
Chief Justice of the Queen’s Bench and first Lord Chief Justice of England, is better supported by 
subsequent legal history because no further naturalization acts would be needed if these children 
were granted full citizenship rights.  See infra Part II.B; accord, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 
18, at 361 (pointing out the need for subsequent naturalization statutes, thereby supporting 
Cockburn’s position).  More importantly, foreign born children of natural born subjects would 
have no need to go through the expensive naturalization process if they had already been 
naturalized by this act.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 49. See text accompanying supra note 26. 
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simultaneously be born in both the ligeance of another sovereign and the 
ligeance of the English monarch.  In Blackstone’s words, “[E]very man owes 
natural allegiance where he is born, and cannot owe two such allegiances, or 
serve two masters, at once.”50 
The inability to inherit English property was not the only handicap facing 
aliens; the 1350 statute left other disabilities intact.  For example, aliens were 
not allowed to purchase real estate for their own use51 or, if someone sold them 
property, they could not enforce such a contract in court.52  Moreover, aliens 
faced higher customs and taxes than did subjects: “[A]liens’ customs were 
double the native customs.”53  In addition, aliens could not be members of 
Parliament or the Privy Council.54  To cure these disabilities, well over two 
hundred children born abroad to English parents were naturalized in the 
centuries after 1350, many of them the issue of an English mother and an 
English father.55  Over three hundred fifty years later, Parliament passed an act 
that finally lifted the naturalization requirement for children born abroad to 
natural born English subjects.56 
B.  Relaxation of the “Jus Soli” Requirement 
One must understand two seventeenth-century statutes in order to analyze 
the eighteenth-century acts that revolutionized the natural born citizen concept.  
From 1641 to 1660the years of the English Civil War and Interregnum 
thousands of English subjects, unhappy with the political order, fled their 
homeland.57  In 1677, Parliament passed An Act for the Naturalizing of 
                                                 
 50. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 361. 
 51. Id. at 360 (pointing out that owning property requires an allegiance to the king); 
COCKBURN, supra note 20, at 139 (remarking that aliens also could not lease property). 
 52. COKE, INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, supra note 21, at § 129b (stating that an alien “cannot 
maintaine either reall or mixt actions” unless he becomes a religious leader whose order owns the 
property). 
 53. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS, supra note 29, at v.  One difference 
between naturalization by Parliament and denization by the king was that the king could require 
the denizen to continue paying alien taxes.  Id. at v–vi (highlighting that this dichotomy allowed 
England to continue generating revenue from foreign born merchants who sought denization 
rights in England to obtain permission to trade). 
 54. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 362.  In fact, in 1700, Parliament provided that the only 
naturalized subjects who were “capable to be of the Privy Council or a Member of either House 
of Parliament or to enjoy any Office or Place of Trust either Civill or Military or to have any 
Grant of Lands Tenements or Hereditaments from the Crown” were “such as [were] born of 
English Parents.”  An Act for the Further Limitation of the Crown and Better Securing the Rights 
and Liberties of the Subject, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3 (Eng.) (footnote omitted). 
 55. For a partial list of such naturalizations, see infra App., at Part I. 
 56. See infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (describing the new naturalization 
requirements). 
 57. See An Act for the Naturalizing of Children of His Majestyes English Subjects Borne in 
Forreigne Countryes Dureing the Late Troubles, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 6, § 1 (Eng.) (explaining that 
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Children of His Majesty’s English Subjects Born in Foreign Countries During 
the Late Troubles “to expresse a due sence of the merit of all such Loyall 
persons as out of their duty and fidelity to his Majesty and his Father of 
Blessed Memory did forgoe or were driven from their Native Country.”58 
The naturalization that the Act provided was neither blanket nor automatic.  
First, it only applied to children of natural born subjects born abroad between 
June 14, 1641, and March 24, 1660.59  Second, to benefit from the statute, the 
child had to go through the usual naturalization process within seven years of 
its enactment; that is, the child had to “receive the [Protestant] Sacrament of 
the Lords Supper and within one moneth next after such receiving the 
Sacrament take the Oathes of Allegiance and Supremacy in some of his 
Majestyes Courts at Westminster.”60  By the oath of allegiance, the alien 
promised fidelity to the king.61  By the oath of supremacy, the alien renounced 
“the pope’s pretended authority.”62  In other words, only Protestants could 
become naturalized under this statute.63 
Although eligible children still had to undergo the naturalization process, the 
statute provided one advantage: children seeking naturalization were spared the 
expense of a private bill in Parliament.  Obtaining naturalization, therefore, 
also became easier and faster for applicants. 
A similar statute was passed at the end of the century.  The act provided that 
children born abroad to natural born subjects who were in the service of the 
king during the Nine Years’ War with France were “taken to all Intents [and] 
Purposes to be and to have been the King’s natural borne Subjects.”64  This 
                                                                                                                 
people were afraid of the king being overthrown), reprinted in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 847 
(1819). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.; cf. An Act That All Such as Are To Be Naturalized or Restored in Blood Shall First 
Receive the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper and the Oath of Allegiance and the Oath of 
Supremacye, 1609, 7 Jac. 1, c. 2, § 1 (Eng.) (setting out the original requirements for 
naturalization repeated in the 1677 Act), reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1157 (1819). 
 61. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 356 (stating that a new subject promised “that he 
w[ould] be faithful and bear true allegiance to the king”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 62. Id. (declaring the oath’s main motivation was to ensure naturalized citizens renounced 
Catholicism). 
 63. Cf. An Act That All Such as Are To Be Naturalized or Restored in Blood Shall First 
Receive the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper and the Oath of Allegiance and the Oath of 
Supremacye, 1609, 7 Jac. 1, c. 2, § 1 (Eng.) (providing that naturalization was “not fit to be 
bestowed upon any others than such as are of the Religion nowe established in this Realme”).  
Therefore, members of other religions used denization to avoid taking the oath of supremacy.  See 
Aliens and Immigrants, supra note 30.  Of course, they did not acquire as many rights as 
naturalized subjects.  See SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS, supra note 29, at iii–viii 
(discussing possible limitations on rights for denizens as compared to naturalized citizens). 
 64. An Act To Naturalize the Children of Such Officers and Soldiers & Others The Natural 
Borne Subjects of This Realme Who Have Been Born Abroad During the War the Parents of 
Such Children Haveing Been In the Service of this Government, 1698, 9 Will. 3, c. 20, § 1 (Eng.), 
reprinted in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 380 (1820). 
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statute applied only to those born abroad between February 13, 1688, and 
March 25, 1698.65  Additionally, to receive the statute’s benefit of relief from 
the expense of a private bill in Parliament, the child had to “receiv[e] the 
Sacrament and tak[e] the Oaths” within five years of reaching age fourteen.66 
In the eighteenth century, Parliament relaxed the jus soli on behalf of foreign 
born children of natural born parents for the first time.  In 1708, Parliament 
passed an Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants.67  Pursuant to the new law, 
any foreign born Protestant could avoid the expense of a private bill in 
Parliament by receiving the sacrament “in some Protestant or reformed 
Congregation” and taking “the Oaths.”68  However, the law went further and 
declared that “the Children of all natural born Subjects born out of the 
Ligeance of Her Majesty[,] Her Heirs and Successors[,] shall be deemed[,] 
adjudged and taken to be natural born Subjects of this Kingdom[,] to all 
Intents[,] Constructions and Purposes whatsoever.”69 
Three short years later, Parliament repealed the part of this Act that provided 
a simpler naturalization process to aliens not born of English parents.70  
Parliament clarified the repeal in 1731, claiming it had not changed the 
provision concerning children “born out of such Ligeance, whose fathers were 
or shall be natural born Subjects of the Crown of England . . . at the time of the 
Birth.”71  Then, in 1773, Parliament reaffirmed the 1731 law regarding foreign 
born children of natural born fathers and extended the opportunity for easy 
naturalization to foreign born children whose paternal grandfathers were 
natural born subjects.72  Thereafter, to become an English subject, the 
                                                 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at § 4. 
 67. An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 1708, 7 Ann., c. 5 (Eng.), reprinted in 9 
STATUTES OF THE REALM 63 (1822). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See An Act To Repeal the Act of the Seventh Year of Her Majesties Reign Intituled An 
Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants (Except What Relates to the Children of Her Majesties 
Natural Born Subjects Born Out of Her Majesties Allegiance), 1711, 10 Ann., c. 5 (Eng.), 
reprinted in 9 STATUTES OF THE REALM 557 (1822). 
 71. An Act To Explain a Clause in an Act Made in the Seventh Year of the Reign of Her 
Late Majesty Queen Anne, For Naturalizing Foreign Protestants, Which Relates to Children of 
the Natural Born Subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, 1731, 4 Geo. 2, c. 21 
(declaring all such children natural born subjects based on the 1711 Act).  The key to being 
“natural born” was the child’s father; having a natural born mother but an alien father left the 
child an alien.  E.g., Doe v. Jones, (1791) 100 Eng. Rep. 1031 (K.B.) 1036, 4 T.R. 301, 309 
(noting that the 1711 Act included both mothers and fathers, but later versions excluded mothers); 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 361 (highlighting the paternal requirement with the exception of 
children of men who had been exiled for treason). 
 72. See An Act To Extend the Provisions of an Act, Made in the Fourth Year of the Reign 
of His Late Majesty King George the Second, Intituled, An Act To Explain a Clause in an Act 
Made in the Seventh Year of the Reign of Her Late Majesty Queen Anne, for Naturalizing 
Foreign Protestants, Which Relates to the Children of the Natural-Born Subjects of the Crown of 
England, or of Great Britain, to the Children of Such Children, 1773, 13 Geo. 3, c. 21 
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grandchild had to move to England, take the required oaths, and “receive the 
Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, according to the Usage of the Church of 
England, or in some Protestant or Reformed Congregation.”73 
These three acts, heralded as “revolutionary” and “novel,” “enunciated a 
new principle in English naturalization law.”74  By declaring persons born in 
the ligeance of another sovereign to be also English subjects, the new statutes 
resolutely rejected “all mediæval conceptions of allegiance.”75  Moreover, they 
“brought into existence a new class of international statuspersons of double 
nationality.”76 
II. THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 
A.  The “Natural Born” Concept Is Added to the Constitution 
Almost nothing is known about why the Clause was added to the 
Constitution because no recorded debate on the subject exists.  The first draft 
of the Constitution to include qualifications for the presidency was reported on 
August 22, 1787.77  This draft provided that “he shall be of the age of thirty 
five years, and a Citizen of the United States, and shall have been an Inhabitant 
thereof for Twenty one years.”78  Earlier, on July 25 of that year, John Jay sent 
the following letter to George Washington,79 who was serving as the president 
of the Constitutional Convention at the time: 
Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise & seasonable to 
provide a . . . strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the 
administration of our national Government; and to declare 
                                                                                                                 
(highlighting the policy to keep trade and wealth in England by making an easier naturalization 
process for merchants and their heirs), reprinted in 9 STATUTES AT LARGE 690 (London, Charles 
Eyre & William Strahan 1773). 
 73. Id.  The 1731 and 1773 naturalization statutes required children to be born outside the 
“realm,” which at that time included both England and Scotland.  See An Act for an Union of the 
Two Kingdoms of England and Scotland, 1706, 6 Ann. c. 11 (Eng.) (adding provisions and 
explanations to the laws that unified England and Scotland), reprinted in 8 STATUTES OF THE 
REALM 566 (1821). 
 74. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS, supra note 29, at xixii (discussing the 
impact of the acts). 
 75. Id. at xii; see supra text accompanying notes 26–27 (explaining feudal origins of the 
concept). 
 76. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURALIZATIONS, supra note 29, at xii. 
 77. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 366 (Max Farrand, ed. 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND] (adding age and residency restrictions). 
 78. Id. at 367 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79. CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 17751789: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 137 (The John Hopkins Press 1922).  One historian suggested that 
Jay also “may have written to others.”  Id. 
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expres[s]ly that the Command in chief of the [A]merican army shall 
not be given to, nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen.80 
On September 2, Washington acknowledged receipt of Jay’s missive and 
thanked him “for the hints contained in [his] letter.”81  Two days later, on 
September 4, a Committee of Eleven82 reported the following provision to the 
Convention: 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the U.S. at 
the time of the adoption of this Constitution shall be eligible to the 
office of President: nor shall any Person be elected to that office, 
who shall be under the age of 35 years, and who has not been in the 
whole, at least 14 years a resident within the U.S.83 
On September 7, the Convention approved these requirements without 
objection,84 and only stylistic changes were made thereafter.85 
One of the most important early American jurists, Joseph Story,86 approved 
of the provision.  In his treatise on the Constitution, he praised the Framers’ 
decision to limit the presidency to “natural born citizen[s].”87  He noted that 
the Clause’s provision that allowed individuals to be naturalized before the 
Constitution’s adoption to become President88 represented “an exception from 
                                                 
 80. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 17861870, at 237 (1905) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].  
One scholar noted that Jay 
was a well-known figure who had been President of the Continental Congress.  
Moreover, he would become an author, along with Alexander Hamilton and James 
Madison, of some of the famous Federalist Papers . . . and, after the Constitution had 
been ratified, he would be appointed as the first Chief Justice of the [United States by 
George Washington]. It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that his letter carried 
some weight. 
John Yinger, The Origins and Interpretation of the Presidential Eligibility Clause in the U.S. 
Constitution: Why Did the Founding Fathers Want the President to be a “Natural-born Citizen” 
and What Does this Clause Mean for Foreign-Born Adoptees?, MAXWELL SCH. (Apr. 6, 2000), 
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/jyinger/citizenship/history.htm (footnote omitted). 
 81. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 80, at 269. 
 82. This committee was “better known as the Committee on Postponed Matters.”  Michael 
Nelson, Constitutional Qualifications for President, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 383, 391 (1987). 
 83. FARRAND, supra note 77, at 494. 
 84. Id. at 536. 
 85. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (illustrating that the current text of the Natural Born 
Citizen Clause differs from the draft at the convention only by expanding or changing a term, and 
retains the draft’s essential meaning). 
 86. Story was simultaneously a justice on the Supreme Court and the first Dane Professor of 
Law at Harvard.  Biographies of the Robes: Joseph Story, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/ 
supremecourt/personality/robes_story.html (last updated Dec. 2006).  In addition, his treatises 
were, and remain, highly regarded in the legal community.  Id. 
 87. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 332 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
 88. The Clause provides that “a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of 
this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
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the great fundamental policy of all governments, to exclude foreign influence 
from their executive councils and duties.”89  Story additionally claimed that 
“the general propriety of the exclusion of foreigners, in common cases, will 
scarcely be doubted by any sound statesman. It cuts off all chances for 
ambitious foreigners who might otherwise be intriguing for the office.”90 
B.  Early Interpretation of the Clause 
First, one might ask whether any substantive distinction existed between the 
concept of “natural born subject” and “natural born citizen.”  Simply, the 
answer is “no.”  As the North Carolina Supreme Court explained in 1838: “The 
term ‘citizen’ as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term 
subject in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from 
the change of government.”91 
Second, the drafters’ interpretation of the Clause is significant.  Did the 
Framers believe they had constitutionalized the common law concept of 
“natural born”?  Or did they consider the English statutes regarding the subject 
to have crossed the Atlantic, too?  Early American sources indicate that the 
Framers intended to write the common law concept into the Constitution.92 
Nicknamed “the Father of the Constitution” for his role in drafting that 
foundational document,93 James Madison is one of the most reliable sources 
for its interpretation.  In 1789, he indicated that the United States followed the 
common law notion of citizenship.  On May 22 of that year, in a speech to the 
House of Representatives, Congressman Madison declared: “It is an 
established maxim that birth is a criterion of allegiance. Birth . . . derives its 
force sometimes from place, and sometimes from parentage; but . . . place is 
the most certain criterion; it is what applies in the United States . . . .”94 
                                                 
 89. STORY, supra note 87, at 332. 
 90. Id. at 333. 
 91. State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 20, 26 (N.C. 1838).  The North Carolina 
court explained, “The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the 
people—and he who before was a ‘subject of the king’ is now ‘a citizen of the State.’”  Id.; 
accord, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 166 (1874); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW 258 n.d [hereinafter KENT (3d ed.)] (“[Both freemen and slaves], if born under 
the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States, are natives, and not aliens. They are what the 
common law terms natural-born subjects. Subject and citizen are, in a degree, convertible terms 
as applied to natives . . . .”).  See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (referring without distinction 
to “Citizens” of American states and “Citizens or Subjects” of foreign states). 
 92. See infra notes 93110 and accompanying text (exploring the different suggestions and 
interpretations by early American theorists). 
 93. James Madison, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/jamesmad 
ison (last visited Nov. 23, 2014). 
 94. 1 ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 404 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) 
[hereinafter 1 ANNALS OF CONG.]. 
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William Rawlea member of the Pennsylvania Constitutional Assembly 
and the first United States Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania95agreed.  
He produced a scholarly treatise on the Constitution and released a second 
edition in 1829.96  He stated that location dictated the meaning of the phrase 
and concluded that “[u]nder our Constitution the question is settled by its 
express language, and when we are informed that . . . no person is eligible to 
the office of president unless he is a natural born citizen, the principle that the 
place of birth creates the relative quality is established as to us.”97 
James Kentthe well-regarded chancellor of New York98also asserted 
that the United States distinguished between “natives” and “aliens” by using 
the “ancient English law” or the “common law.”99  In the first edition of his 
Commentaries on American Law, originally published in 1827, Kent averred: 
“Natives are all persons born within the jurisdiction of the United States.”100  
In the third edition, published in 1836, he added: “They are what the common 
law terms natural-born subjects.”101  He further explained that “[a]n alien is a 
person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States,” with the exception of 
“the children of public ministers abroad.”102 
                                                 
 95. History, RAWLRE & HENDERSON LLP, http://www.rawle.com/history (last visited Nov. 
23, 2014).  He also founded the oldest law firm in America.  Id. 
 96. See Preface to WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATES OF 
AMERICA (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin, Law Bookseller 1829) (declaring that the second 
edition retains the principles explicated in the first edition). 
 97. Id. at 86. 
 98. James Kent, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 
/314984/James-Kent (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).  He was also a lawyer at the time of the 
founding and the first professor of law at Columbia College.  Id. 
 99. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 33, 43 (New York, O. Halsted 
1827) [hereinafter KENT (1st ed.)]. 
 100. Id. at 33. 
 101. KENT (3d ed.), supra note 91, at 258 n.d. 
 102. KENT (1st ed.), supra note 99, at 43.  Unfortunately, Kent then misstated the common 
law of inheritance, suggesting that “children born abroad, of English parents, were capable, at 
common law, of inheriting as natives.”  Id.  For a discussion of the rule at common law, see supra 
note 44 and accompanying text (restating the common law as meaning that children born abroad 
are aliens).  Notably, rather than writing in his usual declaratory style, he qualified his remarks 
with the passive, “it is said.”  KENT (1st ed.), supra note 99, at 43.  Kent’s mistake can be traced 
to dicta by Sir William Hussey in a 1483 case.  See Y.B. 1 Rich. 3, fol. 4a, Mich., pl. 7 (1483) 
(Eng.), reprinted in 11 SELDEN SOCIETY 4 (2007).  See also supra note 43.  Surprisingly, Kent 
did not cite that case, instead citing Hyde v. Hill, (1582), 78 Eng. Rep. 270 (K.B.) 270, 7 Co. Rep. 
18, 18.  KENT (1st ed.), supra note 99, at 43 n.d.  For a thorough analysis of Kent’s error, see 
HORACE BINNEY, THE ALIENIGENÆ OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE PRESENT 
NATURALIZATION LAWS 67 (Philadelphia, C. Sherman 1853) [hereinafter BINNEY, PRESENT 
NATURALIZATION LAWS] (pointing out Kent’s error by comparing his sources and highlighting 
the doubtful language he uses). 
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C.  The Import of Early Naturalization Statutes 
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization,”103 which Congress first exercised in 1790.  
Included in the first Act To Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization was 
the following language: 
[T]he children of citizens of the United States, that may be born 
beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be 
considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of 
citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never 
been resident in the United States . . . .104 
The very existence of this provision demonstrates that the early American 
notion of “natural born citizen” adopted the English common law only and did 
not include the eighteenth-century statutes.  If it had been otherwise, there 
would have been no need for the 1790 statute because the children covered 
would have been natural born under then-current English law. As one 
nineteenth-century senator stated: “[T]he founders of this Government made 
no provisionof course they made nonefor the naturalization of natural-
born citizens.”105 
Moreover, the legislative history suggests that the first Congress intended to 
effectuate a change in the law, not merely to declare the status quo.106  On 
February 3, 1790, Congress began debating a draft bill that provided for 
naturalization.107  The legislature acknowledged the common law principle that 
“[a]n alien has no right to hold lands in any country [but his own].”108  
However, there was no real opposition to “let[ting] foreigners, on easy terms, 
be admitted to hold lands” in America.109  One of Congress’ greatest concerns 
was the prospect of all those immigrants pushing their way into the budding 
nation’s new government.  For example, one congressman, summing up the 
issue, stated: 
A foreigner who comes here is not desirous of interfering 
immediately with our politics; nor is it proper that he should. His 
emigration is governed by a different principle; he is desirous of 
                                                 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 104. An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 10304. 
 105. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 570 (1866) (statement of Sen. Morrill); accord, 
e.g., id. at 598 (statement of Sen. Davis) (“[T]he naturalization laws apply to foreigners alone. . . . 
Congress has no power . . . to naturalize a citizen.”). 
 106. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 94, at 110925 (documenting the debates in the 
House of Representatives and the Senate concerning how to construct the naturalization law of 
the United States). 
 107. Id. at 1109. 
 108. Id. at 1112 (statement of Rep. Hartley).  For the common law rule against aliens holding 
real estate, see supra notes 4051 and accompanying text (discussing the historical context of the 
parallel English concept). 
 109. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 94, at 1118 (statement of Rep. Smith). 
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obtaining and holding property. I should have no objection to his 
doing this, from the first moment he sets his foot on shore in 
America; but it appears to me, that we ought to be cautious how we 
admit emigrants to the other privileges of citizenship . . . . [T]he 
admission of a great number of foreigners to all the places of 
Government, may tincture the system with the dregs of their former 
habits, and corrupt what we believe the most pure of all human 
institutions.110 
In sum, the debate focused on how to balance properly an immigrant’s need to 
purchase or inherit land quickly and Congress’ concerns about granting other 
aspects of citizenship. 
Another congressman, referring to a statute that allowed English children to 
inherit from alien parents,111 suggested that “the . . . children of American 
parents born abroad ought to be provided for, as was done [by Parliament] in 
the case of English parents.”112  In essence, he called for a clause that would 
permit American parents to bequeath property to their alien children.  Thus, he 
understood “children of American parents born abroad” to be aliens and 
ineligible to inherit property. 
At the close of the debate, the House sent the bill back to a subcommittee to 
consider how best to address the issues raised.113  Just before the end of the 
discussion, a member of the subcommittee that originally presented the draft 
bill announced that “he had another clause ready to present, providing for the 
children of American citizens born out of the United States.”114  This comment 
further demonstrates the recognition of an ongoing need to provide for these 
children due to their alien status. 
Because the 1790 Act stated that alien children of American parents would 
“be considered as natural born citizens,” the question remains as to the scope 
of the change Congress intended to effect.  Did Congress mean to amend the 
                                                 
 110. Id. at 1119 (statement of Rep. Stone). 
 111. See An Act to Enable His Majesties Naturall Borne Subjects To Inherite the Estate of 
Their Ancestors Either Lineall or Collaterall Notwithstanding Their Father or Mother Were 
Aliens, 1699, 11 Will. 3, c. 6, reprinted in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 590 (1822).  The 
congressman actually described the statute as enacted in “the 12th year of William III.”  1 
ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 94, at 1121 (statement of Rep. Burke).  His mistake is 
understandable, as the statute was cited in Chitty’s Statutes as “11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 6.”  1 JOSEPH 
CHITTY, CHITTY’S COLLECTION OF STATUTES, WITH NOTES THEREON, INTENDED AS A CIRCUIT 
AND COURT COMPANION 19 (London, Stevens & Norton, 2d ed. 1854).  The Supreme Court 
made the same mistake in its Wong Kim Ark decision.  169 U.S. 649, 661 (1898). 
 112. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 94, at 1121 (statement of Rep. Burke).  One author 
credits this suggestion with the addition of the phrase “natural born” to the 1790 statute: “[T]he 
reference to the English acts shows [that] the origin of the inadvertent error in using the term 
natural-born citizen instead of plain ‘citizen’ came from copying the English Naturalization Act.”  
113 CONG. REC. 15,877 (1967). 
 113. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 94, at 1125. 
 114. Id. (statement of Rep. Hartley). 
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requirements of the Clause statutorily?  As aforementioned, the Framers 
constitutionalized the common law concept of natural born citizen.  Under the 
common law, “[t]he first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens 
and natural-born [citizens].”115  In other words, everyone is either an alien or a 
natural born citizen based on his or her place of birth; that status does not 
change.  Article I grants Congress the power to naturalize, that is, “remove the 
disabilities of alienage.”116  However, Congress does not possess the 
alchemical power to convert one’s status from alien to natural born citizen.117  
If truly Congress’ intent, such a result would expand the requirements of 
Article II without a constitutional amendment. 
Moreover, Parliament’s expansion of the definition of “natural born subject” 
in the eighteenth century sets no precedent with respect to the American 
provision.  In comparison to the American Constitution, the English 
Constitution is unwritten.118  By the late seventeenth century, England’s 
Constitution consisted of whatever Parliament declared as law; Parliament had 
“sovereign and uncontrolable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, 
restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws.”119  As 
such, it could “change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom 
and of parliaments themselves.”120  Parliament certainly had the power to 
extend natural born status to those who otherwise would have been aliens. 
The relationship between Congress and the American Constitution is quite 
different.  According to the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison,121 to allow 
Congress the same latitude as Parliament 
would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It 
would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and 
                                                 
 115. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 354. 
 116. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 597 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting), 
superseded by constitutional amendment  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 117. Justice Benjamin Curtis of the Supreme Court explained: 
Among the powers expressly granted to Congress is “the power to establish a uniform 
rule of naturalization.” It is not doubted that this is a power to prescribe a rule for the 
removal of the disabilities consequent on foreign birth. To hold that it extends further 
than this, would do violence to the meaning of the term naturalization, fixed in the 
common law, . . . and in the minds of those who concurred in framing and adopting the 
Constitution. It was in this sense of conferring on an alien and his issue the rights and 
powers of a native-born citizen, that it was employed in the Declaration of 
Independence. It was in this sense it was expounded in the Federalist, (No. 42,) has 
been understood by Congress, by the Judiciary, . . . and by commentators on the 
Constitution. . . . It appears, then, that the only power expressly granted to Congress to 
legislate concerning citizenship, is confined to the removal of the disabilities of foreign 
birth. 
Id. at 578 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
 118. STEVEN M. BARKAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 484 (9th ed. 2009). 
 119. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 156. 
 120. Id. 
 121. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, 
completely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall 
do what is expressly forbid[d]en, such act, notwithstanding the 
express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the 
legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath 
which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits.122 
Therefore, Congress cannot alter who is eligible to run for President by statute.  
Such a dramatic change requires a constitutional amendment.123 
Unsurprisingly, no evidence suggests Congress intended to expand the class 
of persons who could run for President.  Moreover, early commentators agreed 
that the use of “natural born” in the first naturalization act did not amend 
Article II.  For example, St. George Tuckera professor of law at the College 
of William and Mary124published his edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries 
in 1803, wherein he provided his own notes concerning the differences 
between English and American law.125  With respect to naturalization and 
citizenship, he cited all of the American naturalization statutes enacted to that 
date, including the 1790 Act.126  He then concluded that “[p]ersons [] 
naturalized according to these acts, are entitled to all the rights of natural-born 
citizens, except . . . they are forever incapable of being chosen to the office of 
president of the United States.”127 
In any event, Congress swiftly repealed the 1790 statute in 1795.128  This 
time, debate in the House focused on several issues, including whether aliens 
seeking naturalization should be made to renounce (1) foreign hereditary titles 
and (2) any claim to persons then held in slavery.129  The House voted “yea” 
                                                 
 122. Id. at 178. 
 123. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this basic tenet of American constitutional law: 
Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers. . . . The 
judicial authority to determine the constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies, 
is based on the premise that the “powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and 
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.” 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997). 
 124. Craig Evan Klafter, St. George Tucker: The First Modern American Law Professor, 6 J. 
HIST. SOC’Y 133, 139 (2006). 
 125. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 36675 (Philadelphia, William Young 
Birch & Abraham Small 1803). 
 126. Id. at 374 n.12. 
 127. Id.; accord, e.g., BINNEY, PRESENT NATURALIZATION LAWS, supra note 102, at 2122 
(noting the 1790 statute “naturalized” natives’ children born outside of the United States). 
 128. BINNEY, PRESENT NATURALIZATION LAWS, supra note 102, at 22. 
 129. For the House of Representatives debate on renouncing foreign hereditary titles, see 4 
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 100409, 102123, 102558, 106061, 106466 (1849) [hereinafter 4 
ANNALS OF CONG.].  On the subject of persons held in slavery, see id. at 103941.  For the 
Senate debate on both topics, see id. at 80912, 81416. 
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on the first question and “nay” on the second.130  On January 2, 1795, the bill 
was recommitted to a select committee of three individuals, one of whom was 
James Madison.131  Earlier, on December 29, 1794, Madison had expressed the 
opinion that Congress had no naturalization authority over American citizens: 
“It was only granted to them to admit aliens.”132  The following Monday, 
January 5, 1795, “Mr. Madison . . . reported a new bill of Naturalization, 
containing the amendments recommitted, and also whatever was necessary 
from the Old Law, so that the latter should be entirely superceded.”133  
Madison salvaged the “Old Law” provision that granted naturalization rights to 
children of American citizens born abroad.134  Interestingly, the phrase “natural 
born” was deleted without any recorded debate on the issue.135  The new 
statute provided in pertinent part that “the children of citizens of the United 
States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be 
considered as citizens of the United States: Provided, That the right of 
citizenship shall not descend to persons, whose fathers have never been 
resident in the United States.”136  The law established that the alien child was 
only naturalized, not declared a natural born citizen.137 
D.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
Thus the definition of “natural born citizen” stood in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Horace Binney—a respected early American attorney and 
statesman138—published an article on the topic in 1854.  He wrote that the 
rules were clear: 
                                                 
 130. Id. at 1057. 
 131. Id. at 1040, 1058. 
 132. Id. at 1027. 
 133. Id. at 1060. 
 134. Id. at 1041, 1053, 1061. 
 135. See Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA: The 
Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity in the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications 
Clause and Why We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 7879 (2005) (acknowledging the 
deletion and commenting that “[t]he term ‘natural-born’ never again appeared in the 
naturalization laws of the United States”). 
 136. An Act To Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization; and To Repeal the Act 
Heretofore Passed on That Subject, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415 (1795). 
 137. Referring to “the inadvertent use of the term natural-born in the Act of 1790,” one 
author averred that “it was Mr. Madison who had participated in the drafting of the Constitution 
who had discovered the error and authorized the bill to correct it by deleting the term from the act 
of 1795.”  113 CONG. REC. 15,879 (1967) (quoting Hon. Pinkney G. McElwee).  See Duggin & 
Collins, supra note 135, at 7879. 
 138. Binney studied law at the Philadelphia law office of Jared Ingersoll, CHARLES C. 
BINNEY, THE LIFE OF HORACE BINNEY 2930 (1903) [hereinafter BINNEY, THE LIFE OF 
HORACE], who signed the Constitution for Pennsylvania, Jared Ingersoll (1749-1822), PENN U. 
ARCHIVES & RECS. CENTER, http://www.archives.upenn.edu/people/1700s/ingersoll_jared.html 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2014).  An interesting, albeit irrelevant, fact is that the young Binney started 
the Harvard Hasty Pudding Club in 1795.  BINNEY, THE LIFE OF HORACE, supra note 138, at 27. 
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The notion that there is any common law principle to naturalize the 
children born in foreign countries, of native-born American father 
and mother, father or mother, must be discarded. There is not and 
never was any such common law principle. . . . [T]he citizens of the 
United States are, [with the exception of those children covered by 
one of the corollaries], such only as are either . . . born within the 
limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or naturalized 
by . . . virtue of an Act of the Congress of the United States.139 
At this time, however, debate about another aspect of these rules came to a 
head: were children of African descent born in the United States natural born 
citizens?  Chancellor Kent wrote that “[b]lacks, whether born free or in 
bondage, if born under the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States, 
[were] natives, and not aliens. They [were] what the common law terms 
natural-born subjects.”140  Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis concurred: 
“[T]he Constitution uses the language, ‘a natural-born citizen.’ . . . 
Undoubtedly, this language . . . was used in reference to that principle of 
public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth.”141  
Unfortunately, Justice Curtis was one of only two dissenters in the infamous 
1857 Dred Scott v. Sandford142 decision.143  The majority held that African 
Americans descended from slaves could not be U.S. citizens.144 
Following the American Civil War, Congress drafted—and the states 
ratified—the Fourteenth Amendment.145  The first section provides: “All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside.”146  While this language reversed Dred Scott, it did not otherwise 
change the law with respect to citizenship.  In describing the opening sentence 
of the amendment, one senator stated that “[i]t simply declares who shall be 
citizens of the United States.  But the fact that certain persons are citizens, and 
the number of them, and the definition of citizenship or of its constituent 
elements, were just the same before the ratification of the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment that they are now.”147 
                                                 
 139. BINNEY, PRESENT NATURALIZATION LAWS, supra note 102, at 2021. 
 140. KENT (3d ed.), supra note 91, at 258 n.d. 
 141. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 576 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting), 
superseded by constitutional amendment  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 142. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 143. Id. at 529. 
 144. Id. at 419, 423. 
 145. See Primary Documents in American History, supra note 13. 
 146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 147. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., special Sess. app. 47 (1871) (statement of Rep. Kerr); 
accord, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 570 (1866) (statement of Sen. Morrill) (“[T]his 
amendment, although it is a grand enunciation, although it is a lofty and sublime declaration, has 
no force or efficiency as an enactment. I hail it and accept it simply as a declaration.”). 
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At the close of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court decided a case that 
centered on the citizenship of a man born to Chinese parents in the United 
States.148  The Court held that he was natural born and, as such, he was a 
citizen.149  The Court explicated the law as it then stood in the United States: 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution . . . contemplates 
two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization. . . . 
Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no 
naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United 
States can only become a citizen by being naturalized . . . by 
authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of 
persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship 
upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by enabling foreigners 
individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial 
tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts.150 
According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment made explicit what had 
been the law all along: those individuals born within the United States were 
natural born citizens; all others were aliens unless naturalized.151 
III.  THE WEAKNESSES OF MODERN HISTORIES 
A.  Modern Scholarly Interpretations of English Law 
One modern source, written around the time of Governor Romney’s 
presidential candidacy, purports to describe English naturalization law prior to 
the ratification of the U.S. Constitution.152  Written by Charles Gordon while 
he served as General Counsel for the United States Immigration and 
Naturalization Service,153 the article contains certain flaws in both fact and 
reasoning.  Unfortunately, subsequent articles have relied on his inaccurate 
research as definitive.154 
First, Gordon misstates the common law when he writes: “[T]he leading 
British authorities agree that under the early common law, status as a natural-
born subject probably was acquired only by those born within the realm . . . 
.”155  This was the rule at common law, not “early” common law.156  Further, 
                                                 
 148. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 65253 (1898). 
 149. Id. at 704. 
 150. Id. at 70203. 
 151. This rule applied to all children born in the United States, except those to whom the 
corollaries apply.  See supra notes 2224 and accompanying text. 
 152. Gordon, supra note 17, at 67. 
 153. Id. at 1 n.* (stating Charles Gordon’s qualifications). 
 154. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 82, at 396 n.45 (citing only the Gordon article for authority 
on English history in connection with naturalization); Yinger, supra note 80, at n.38 (noting that 
the Gordon article “is the source of the information in this paragraph”). 
 155. Gordon, supra note 17, at 7. 
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birth within the ligeance of the king was the determinative factor, not birth 
within the realm.157  Also, there was no “probably” about it; in the words of 
Blackstone, “[t]he common law indeed stood absolutely so.”158 
Further, Gordon errs more seriously by asserting that those same British 
authorities propounded the view that the statutes described above “enabled 
natural-born subjects to transmit equivalent status at birth to the children born 
to them outside of the kingdom.”159  The statutes to which he refers include the 
1350 inheritance law160 and the special provision of 1677 that permitted easy 
naturalization following the restoration of the monarchy.161  However, neither 
of those statutes made such children subjects without being naturalized.162  
Only the eighteenth-century acts accomplished that goal.163  As previously 
demonstrated, before the eighteenth century, children born abroad to English 
subjects had to be naturalized in order to attain status equivalent to that of their 
parents. 
Gordon cites four authorities for his proposition.  However, none of them 
support his assertion.  The first cited source,164 Sir Edward Coke, explicitly 
stated in 1628 that any issue born to an Englishman “out[side] of the king’s 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Gordon makes two mistakes here. First, he incorrectly believes that English statutes 
prior to the eighteenth century Parliamentary acts changed the common law definition of “natural 
born subject.”  Id.  For a discussion of the impact of these statutes, see supra notes 4244, 5860, 
6773 and accompanying text.  Second, he apparently believes that the statutory scheme of the 
eighteenth century was part of the common law.  Gordon, supra note 17, at 7.  For a discussion of 
the change these statutes wrought, see supra notes 7576 and accompanying text. 
 157. For a discussion of the difference between being out of the ligeance of the king and out 
of the realm, see text accompanying supra notes 1823. 
 158. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 361 (footnote omitted); accord, e.g., COCKBURN, supra 
note 20, at 7 (declaring the English common law focused on the “dominions of the Crown”).  See 
also COKE, INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, supra note 21, at § 129a (defining aliens as those born out 
of the allegiance, not the realm, of the king). 
 159. Gordon, supra note 17, at 7.  Other modern authors follow Gordon to the same mistaken 
conclusion.  E.g., Nelson, supra note 82, at 396 (citing Gordon for the proposition that “starting 
in 1350” Parliament expanded definition of “natural born” to include “babies born of British 
citizens abroad”); Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential 
Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 
888 n.35 (1988) (citing Gordon and asserting that “British statutes have provided for [acquisition 
of citizenship at birth by children born abroad to] British subjects since the 14th century”); 
Yinger, supra note 80, at n.38 (relying on Gordon for statement that “1677 law says that ‘natural 
born’ citizens include people born overseas to British citizens”). 
 160. See A Statute for Those Who Are Born in Parts Beyond Sea, 1350, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 1, 
reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 310 (1801). 
 161. See An Act for the Naturalizing of Children of His Majestyes English Subjects Borne in 
Forreigne Countryes Dureing the Late Troubles, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 6, § 1 (Eng.). 
 162. See supra notes 42, 44, and 5860 and accompanying text (discussing the impact these 
statutes had on naturalization and the continuing requirement for children to go through the 
process of making oaths). 
 163. See supra notes 6773 and accompanying text. 
 164. Gordon, supra note 17, at 7 n.46. 
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liegeance” could not inherit from that Englishman.165  The second cited 
source,166 Sir William Blackstone, interpreted the 1350 statute as allowing 
“children born abroad” to “inherit.”167  As to the 1677 statute, he noted that it 
“became necessary” because the common law was “absolute”: children born 
abroad to those English subjects who had fled “during the late troubles” were 
aliens.168  The third jurist Gordon relies upon,169 Sir Alexander Cockburn, 
declared in 1869 that the 1350 law referred only to “children inheritors.”170  
Otherwise, he reasoned, “the subsequent legislation on this subject would have 
been wholly unnecessary.”171  The final authority Gordon cites,172 Oxford 
professor Albert Venn Dicey, proclaimed the same in 1896: “The principle of 
the common law is that a person born beyond the limits of the British 
dominions does not at his birth owe allegiance to the Crown, and cannot 
therefore be a natural-born British subject.”173  He added that this principle was 
not “relaxed” until the eighteenth century.174 
Had Gordon’s mischaracterization occurred in a musty piece of scholarship 
dissecting an obscure archaic principle, it might not have been cause for 
concern.  However, this error in interpretation is problematic because the 
common law concept is key to understanding the American constitutional 
provision.  Unfortunately, he compounded this mistake by supporting his 
incorrect conclusions with the alleged intentions of the Constitution’s Framers: 
The Framers certainly were aware of the long-settled British practice, 
reaffirmed in recent legislation in England . . . to grant full status of 
natural-born subjects to the children born overseas to British 
subjects. There was no warrant for supposing that the Framers 
wished to deal less generously with their own children.175 
Contrary to Gordon’s assertions, the “recent legislation in England” created 
the practice; it did not “reaffirm[ ]” it.176  This mistake jeopardizes any attempt 
to understand the Clause.  Here, Gordon not only described the law incorrectly, 
but also “suppose[ed]” what the Framers did or did not “wish[].”177  Looking 
                                                 
 165. COKE, INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, supra note 21, at § 8a. 
 166. Gordon, supra note 17, at 7 n.47. 
 167. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 361. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Gordon, supra note 17, at 7 n.48. 
 170. COCKBURN, supra note 20, at 9. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Gordon, supra note 17, at 7 n.49. 
 173. A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 178 (London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1896). 
 174. Id. at 178 & n.1. 
 175. Gordon, supra note 17, at 78 (footnotes omitted). 
 176. Id. at 7. 
 177. Id. at 8. 
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to the actual statements of early American jurists provides better guidance.  
After all, their comments are available. 
Yet Gordon’s kind of guesswork, filled with “maybe” and “perhaps,” 
dominates purported “scholarship” in this field.  For example, one author 
declares, without citing any authority whatsoever, that “the Founding Fathers 
used the term ‘natural born’ as an expansive definition of citizenship, that is, as 
a way to make certain that people born overseas to American citizens would 
have the full rights of other American citizens.”178  Another source, relying 
solely on Gordon’s article, avers that “[o]ne can presume only that Jay and the 
delegates meant to apply the evolved, broader common law meaning of the 
term when they included it in the presidential qualifications clause.”179  
Another source lacking any cited authority claims that the eighteenth-century 
British statutes “undoubtedly informed the Framers’ understanding of the 
Natural Born Citizen Clause.”180  However, the Framers’ own words directly 
contradict each of these undocumented theories. 
B.  Modern Scholarly Interpretations of Early American Understandings 
1.  The Common Law 
As this Article demonstrates, the evidence points to only one conclusion: the 
Framers constitutionalized the common law notion of “natural born”—not the 
notion expanded upon by the English naturalization statutes—into Article II.  
Nonetheless, most commentators currently addressing this question contend 
that the Framers adopted a broader view.  These authors posit that children 
born abroad to American parents satisfy the constitutional requirement.181  In 
addition to relying on a mistaken understanding of the English statutes, current 
American pundits suggest a few other creative arguments to support their view.  
However, none can be substantiated. 
First, numerous scholars who claim that the Framers adopted an expansive 
view of “natural born” use the example of John Jay’s children.182  Jay, of 
course, was the man who suggested to George Washington that the 
Commander-in-Chief should be a natural born citizen.183  In the words of one 
modern jurist, “[c]ertainly Jay did not mean to bar his own children, born in 
                                                 
 178. Yinger, supra note 80. 
 179. Nelson, supra note 82, at 396 (emphasis added). 
 180. Laurence H. Tribe & Theodore B. Olson, Opinion Letter, Presidents and Citizenship, 2 
J. LAW 509, 510 (2008). 
 181. See, e.g., JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42097, QUALIFICATIONS FOR 
PRESIDENT AND THE “NATURAL-BORN” CITIZENSHIP ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT 1820 (2011), 
available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42097.pdf; Gordon, supra note 17, at 18; Christina S. 
Lohman, Presidential Eligibility: The Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen Clause, 36 GONZ. L. 
REV. 349, 369 (2000); Nelson, supra note 82, at 396. 
 182. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 82, at 396. 
 183. Gordon, supra note 17, at 5. 
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Spain and France while he was on diplomatic assignments, from legal 
eligibility to the presidency.”184  However, this reasoning does not withstand 
scrutiny.  Assuming arguendo that Jay had presidential aspirations for his 
children, the common law was no bar to them.  Children born to those on 
diplomatic missions abroad were natural born citizens.185 
Another attempt to establish the broader interpretation points to a different 
presidential requirement for support: the candidate must have lived in the 
United States for a minimum of fourteen years.186  The writer, Gordon, 
speculates that “[i]f the Framers were speaking only of the native-born, this 
limitation would hardly have been necessary.”187  This conclusion ignores the 
alternative explanation that everyone born in the United States is a natural born 
citizen, even those children whose parents are only here temporarily.  The 
residency requirement ensures that such children could not become candidates 
for the American presidency as adults after being raised in a different 
country.188  Without considering this rationale, the commentator opines, “[The 
residency requirement] seems consistent with a supposition that the ‘natural-
born’ qualification was intended to include those who had acquired United 
States citizenship at birth abroad.”189  In short, the author rejects an 
explanation completely in accord with the understanding expressly stated by 
the Framers in favor of a hypothetical explanation that “seem[ingly]” backs up 
his own “supposition,”190 without offering a shred of evidence. 
A third approach includes an author who attempts to establish that the 
Constitution incorporates the broader view of “natural born.”  The writer 
correctly notes that it was “common in the states after independence, upon the 
adoption of their constitutions and statutes, to incorporate both the common 
law of England, as well as the statutory laws adopted by Parliament and 
                                                 
 184. Nelson, supra note 82, at 396; accord, e.g., MASKELL, supra note 181, at 1920; 
Gordon, supra note 17, at 8 n.55; Yinger, supra note 80. 
 185. According to Chancellor Kent, “the children of [American] public ministers abroad” 
were natural born citizens of the United States.  KENT (1st ed.), supra note 99, at 43. 
 186. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 187. Gordon, supra note 17, at 3. 
 188. The requirement is not limited to such children, of course. American parents may move 
abroad with their children as well.  Moreover, there was some question about whether Herbert 
Hoover met the fourteen-year residency requirement.  J. Michael Medina, The Presidential 
Qualification Clause in this Bicentennial Year: The Need to Eliminate the Natural Born Citizen 
Requirement, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 253, 257 n.15 (1987).  He was born and raised in the 
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Clark Hoover: A Biographical Sketch, HERBERT HOOVER PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, 
http://hoover.archives.gov/education/hooverbio.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).  Thus, he had 
only been back in the United States for about eleven years when he was elected President in 1928.  
See id.  Of course, he had lived twenty-three years in the United States before his time overseas.  
See id. 
 189. Gordon, supra note 17, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. 
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applicable in the colonies up until a particular date.”191  These state laws are 
known as “reception statutes.”192  Directly following this accurate assertion, 
the author incorrectly implies that the federal government also adopted a 
modified version of the common law: 
There is thus some argument and indication that it was common for a 
“modified” English common lawmodified by long-standing 
provisions of English statutory law applicable in the coloniesto be 
among the traditions and bodies of law incorporated into the laws, 
applications, usages, and interpretations in the beginning of our 
nation.193 
The commentator, citing the Gordon article,194 predictably makes the same 
mistake.  Like Gordon, the writer concludes that the broad view of the term 
“natural born” was long-standing in England.195  However, more importantly, 
the author fails to mention that Congress did not enact a reception statute.  
Therefore, that the states adopted some English statutes is irrelevant when 
discussing the meaning of the Constitution. 
Several authors claim the language of the Clause is confusing. They suggest 
that perhaps the Framers did not adopt the common law meaning of the phrase 
or that the original meaning is unknowable.  For example, one states that “[t]he 
notion of a ‘natural born citizen’ was likely a term of art derived from the idea 
of a ‘natural born subject’ in English law . . . . But the Constitution speaks of 
‘citizens’ and not ‘subjects,’ introducing uncertainties and ambiguities . . . .”196  
As discussed above, however, early Americans considered the two terms to be 
analogous. 
Other pundits speculate that “natural born” is not synonymous with “native 
born.”197  Natives are those individuals born within the country’s borders, and 
therefore, use of the term “natural” instead indicates to these authors that the 
Framers must have meant something different. With no evidence, these writers 
assume the phrase includes children born abroad to American citizens.198  Of 
course, myriad statements by early American jurists use the terms “natural 
born” and “native born” interchangeably.199  In fact, Chancellor Kent defined 
“natives” as “what the common law terms natural-born subjects.”200 
                                                 
 191. MASKELL, supra note 181, at 16. 
 192. Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 5 (1966) (defining 
“reception” statute and providing a state law example). 
 193. MASKELL, supra note 181, at 16 (emphasis added). 
 194. Id. at 16 nn.7274. 
 195. Id. at 16; see supra notes 15357 and accompanying text. 
 196. Solum, supra note 7, at 30. 
 197. E.g., MASKELL, supra note 181, at 20 (finding “natural born” to be more inclusive); 
Yinger, supra note 80 (looking to the dictionary definition of each term). 
 198. Yinger, supra note 80 (distinguishing between “natural born” and “naturalized”). 
 199. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 575 (1871) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) 
(noting the Constitution requires that the President “be a native-born citizen”); CONG. GLOBE, 
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2.  The 1790 Statute 
Because the first American naturalization statute provided that children born 
abroad to U.S. citizens shall be “considered as natural born citizens,”201 many 
modern commentators believe it is evidence of something, although they 
disagree as to what.202  These authors note that, as the Supreme Court stated, 
an act “passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of 
whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, . . . is 
contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning.”203  However, this 
Congress was not infallible; it was the very same body that drafted the statute 
declared unconstitutional in Marbury v. Madison.204 
Startlingly, two modern authors argue that Congress possesses the inherent 
power to alter the meaning of the Constitution by statute.  They posit that the 
1790 Act changed the definition of “natural born citizen”: “[The constitutional 
phrase now] would appear to include those born abroad of U.S. citizens . . . as 
adopted by Congress by statute.”205  However, these writers contend that the 
1790 provision was not a naturalization law that offered citizenship rights to 
aliens.206  Instead, they say, “the provision under discussion purports to 
recognize a certain category of persons as citizens from and because of 
birth.”207  In their view, Congress did not use its Article I power to enact “an 
uniform rule of naturalization.”  Nonetheless, these authors argue that the law 
was constitutional under “the proposition that, as the legislative body of a 
                                                                                                                 
40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1035 (1869) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (“The Constitution requires that 
the President must be a native-born citizen of the United States.”); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1105 (1868) (statement of Rep. Clarke) (noting “that the President and Vice President must 
be native born”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 573 (1866) (statement of Sen. Williams) 
(“The Constitution of the United States provides that no person but a native-born citizen of the 
United States . . . shall be President of the United States . . . .”); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 552 (1865) (statement of Sen. Johnson) (“No one who is not a native-born citizen of the 
United States . . . can be voted for [for President.]”). 
 200. KENT (3d ed.), supra note 91, at 258 n.d. 
 201. An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, 10304. 
 202. See, e.g., MASKELL, supra note 181, at 2021 (suggesting the Framers’ intent to make a 
broad definition of “natural born”); Gordon, supra note 17, at 8 (declaring that the 1790 Act 
created three ways for individuals to become U.S. citizens: birthright, birthright to naturalized 
citizens, and naturalization); Lohman, supra note 181, at 370 (finding that the Act could not alter 
the Constitution and merely incorporated the children of foreign nations into “natural born” 
citizens); Pryor, supra note 159, at 89495 (positing that this phrase was indicative of the 
Framers extending the power of naturalization to those born abroad). 
 203. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888). 
 204. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 (1803) (holding portion of Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 
13, 1 Stat. 73, 80, unconstitutional). 
 205. E.g., MASKELL, supra note 181, at 21 (referring to EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE 
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 17871984, at 3839 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. 
ed. 1984)). 
 206. E.g., id. at 21 (quoting CORWIN, supra note 205, at 39). 
 207. CORWIN, supra note 205, at 39. 
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nation sovereign at international law, Congress is entitled to determine who 
shall and who shall not be admitted to the body politic.”208 
Not surprisingly, the support for this theory is virtually nonexistent.  The 
author of the later piece only cites the earlier piece.209  The author of the earlier 
piece relies heavily on a 1915 Supreme Court holding that an American 
woman’s marriage to an immigrant caused her expatriation.210  The Court 
reasoned that the power to expatriate is “implied, necessary or incidental to the 
expressed power[ ]” to naturalize.211  However, the idea that the concept of 
naturalization inherently encompasses expatriation differs greatly from the 
assertion that Congress may amend a different article of the Constitution by 
statute.  A bedrock principle of our constitutional system holds that Congress 
cannot make such an alteration.  Moreover, this theory about the meaning and 
effect of the 1790 statute disregards the original understanding that the Act 
simply provided for naturalization of alien children born abroad to U.S. 
citizens. 
Alternatively, two commentators attempt to avoid suggesting that Congress 
can amend the Constitution.  Rather, they urge that the language of the 1790 
statute demonstrates that “the Founding Fathers, who dominated this Congress, 
believed that the right to define ‘natural born’ was conferred by the 
‘naturalization’ clause.”212  However, these authors only present the pedigree 
of the Congress and the fact that “natural” is the root word of “naturalization” 
to support their theory that “Congress nearly contemporaneous with the 
adoption of the clause believed it had the power to define ‘natural born citizen’ 
under its naturalization powers.”213  One of the authors does admit that “the 
link between ‘natural born’ and ‘naturalization’ was never made explicit by the 
Founding Fathers, and the term ‘natural born’ does not appear in any 
                                                 
 208. Id. 
 209. MASKELL, supra note 181, at 21 n.97 (citing and quoting only CORWIN, supra note 205, 
at 3839). 
 210. CORWIN, supra note 205, at 39 & n.6 (citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 30712 
(1915) (upholding An Act in Reference to the Expatriation of Citizens and Their Protection 
Abroad, c. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 122829 (1907) (declaring that a woman assumes the 
nationality of her husband upon marriage))). 
 211. Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 311.  The Court added that “[a]s a government, the United States 
is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty.”  Id.  The case, however, required no inquiry into 
just what those attributes are, id., and so it is a stretch to push this dicta into the very broad power 
Corwin and Maskell both claim for Congress.  Moreover, as the Court noted, the power to 
expatriate existed long before 1915.  Id. at 30809.  In fact, one of the earliest Congresses had 
recognized the connection between naturalization and expatriation.  On Tuesday, December 30, 
1794, the House of Representatives debated a provision that would have expatriated any 
American who became a citizen or subject of another country.  4 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 
129, at 102830.  After a discussion of the wisdom of the policy, but expressing no concern about 
its constitutionality, the amendment was negated.  Id. at 1030. 
 212. Yinger, supra note 80; accord Pryor, supra note 159, at 895 (positing that the 1790 Act 
was Congress’ exercise of its “naturalization powers”). 
 213. Pryor, supra note 159, at 895. 
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naturalization legislation passed since 1790.”214  Nonetheless, he maintains his 
conclusion. 
Unsurprisingly, these authors present scant evidence to bolster their claims.  
Congress had no need to define the term “natural born” in 1790 because its 
meaning was already well established.  Natural born citizens were natives; 
naturalization was for aliens.215  The authors may actually mean that Congress 
could change the Article II limitation by exercising the Article I power and 
“defining” the phrase.  If so, this proposition also fails because, as discussed 
above, Congress cannot amend the Constitution by statute. 
Finally, one pair of lawyers recognizes that “[c]learly, the First Congress 
could not statutorily alter the Constitution.”216  These commentators, Gordon 
and Christina Lohman, instead suggest that the 1790 statute was declaratory of 
the law.  Gordon explains that the statute “was enacted to remove any doubt 
that status as a natural born citizen was acquired by a child born abroad to 
American citizen parents.”217  Lohman posits that the Act merely “interpret[ed] 
the Constitution.”218  This conclusion contradicts commentary by early 
American jurists, so the authority these authors cite provides weak support.  
Lohman relies solely on Gordon’s work for support.219  Gordon relies on a 
dissenting Supreme Court opinion and two New York state decisions.220 
In the Supreme Court dissent, Justice Fuller disregarded centuries of 
common law jurisprudence and used a strained reading of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to conclude that a man born to Chinese parents in the United 
States could not be a natural born citizen.221  He was joined by only one other 
justice,222 while the remainder of the Court rejected his reasoning.223  
Following the common law, the majority held that the nationality of the man’s 
                                                 
 214. Yinger, supra note 80. 
 215. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 598 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis) 
(“[T]he naturalization laws apply to foreigners alone. . . . Congress has no power . . . to naturalize 
a citizen.”). 
 216. Lohman, supra note 181, at 371.  See also Gordon, supra note 17, at 9 (noting that a 
different interpretation “might still leave open the question of whether Congress can enlarge or 
modify the categories of eligible citizens encompassed within the presidential qualification 
clause”). 
 217. Gordon, supra note 17, at 9. 
 218. Lohman, supra note 181, at 371. 
 219. Id. at 37072 (relying solely on Gordon, supra note 17, at 4, 811, and David P. Currie, 
The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 17891791, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 775, 776865 (1994), for the proposition that the first Congress continued the work of the 
Constitutional Convention, “consciously aware that their power was constitutionally limited”). 
 220. Ludlum v. Ludlum, 26 N.Y. 356 (1863); Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. C. 583, 660 (N.Y. 
1844); Gordon, supra note 17, at 9 n.69 (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 
714 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting)). 
 221. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 732 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
 222. See id. at 705 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (including Justice Harlan in his dissent). 
 223. Id. at 65594 (setting out the law of citizenship at common law and in the United States 
from the time of the founding until the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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parents did not matter and that his birth on American soil made him a natural 
born citizen.224  The dissent can be rejected out of hand; it is certainly not 
authoritative on the meaning of early American law. 
The two New York opinions declared that, starting in 1350, children born 
abroad to English parents were natural born citizens.225 -To reach this 
conclusion, the cases relied heavily on two questionable English sources.226  
First, the state courts cited dicta that failed to support the courts’ assertions.227  
Second, the courts used a note that discussed a case decided hundreds of years 
before.228  Unfortunately, that note was based on mistaken facts.229  Moreover, 
the view expressed by the New York courts is simply inconsistent with the 
hundreds of naturalizations of such children in the centuries after 1350.230  
Therefore, these cases fall short when compared to the great weight, and the 
better reasoning of, other authority on the subject.231 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The introduction to this Article posed a question: “in the eyes of early 
Americans, would someone born in a foreign country of American parents be a 
‘natural born citizen’ and therefore eligible to be President of the United 
States?”  The pertinent historical materials lead to only one conclusion: aside 
from children born to U.S. ambassadors or soldiers in hostile armies, the 







                                                 
 224. Id. at 705. 
 225. Ludlum, 26 N.Y. at 366; Lynch, 1 Sand. Ch. at 660. 
 226. Ludlum, 26 N.Y. at 362, 366; Lynch, 1 Sand. Ch. at 660. 
 227. Y.B. 1 Rich. 3, fol. 4a, Mich., pl. 7 (1483) (Eng.), reprinted in 11 SELDEN SOC’Y 4 
(2007) (suggesting in dicta that the English common law and the 1350 statute were declaratory 
but not discussing whether alien children became subjects).  See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 
18, at 36162 (pointing out the need for subsequent naturalization statutes in addition to the 
common law). 
 228. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 66970. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See infra App. 
 231. The Vice Chancellor, who wrote one of the New York opinions, referred to comments 
supposedly made by “Ch. J. Tindal” and “Parke, Justice” in the case of “Doe dem. Thomas v. 
Ackland.” Lynch, 1 Sand. Ch. at 660.  However, he may never have read the English source 
because the party was Acklam, not Ackland. Doe v. Acklam, 1824, 107 Eng. Rep. 572 (K.B.) 
572, 2 B&C 778.  Moreover, Tindal and Parke were attorneys for the plaintiff and defendant, 
respectively.  Id. at 574, 577. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A Partial List of ChildrenBorn Abroad to English ParentsWho Were 
Naturalized 
 
Part I: 15091603 
 
Source: HUGUENOT SOCIETY OF LONDON, LETTERS OF DENIZATION AND ACTS 
OF NATURALIZATION FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND, 15091603 (William Page ed., 
1893). Page numbers in the following table refer to this book. 
 
Year* Children Naturalized by Parliament Page 
1542 Edward Castelyn, born in Greece, son of William 
Castelyn, mercer of London, and Angeleca, daughter of 
Michael Villacho of Greece 
43 
 John Dymock, born in Antwerp, son of John Dymock, late 
gentleman usher of the king’s chamber, and Beatrice, his 
wife, daughter of John Van Cleve of Antwerp 
86 
 Children, born beyond the sea, of Thomas Poyntz, grocer 
of London 
196 
1544 Mathew and Gilbert Dethicke, sons of Robert Dethicke, 
born in Derbyshire, and Agatha, his wife, daughter of 
Mathis Leyendecker of Acon 
77 
 John Mary Fathe, born in Genoa, son of Robert Fathe, in 
the king’s service, and Jeronyma, his wife, daughter of 
Frauncis Denoto 
90 
 Richard, Thomas, and William May, born in Portugal, 
sons of William May, skinner and merchant of London, 
and Isabell, his wife, daughter of John Balyro of Portugal 
167 
1553 Gersone and Barnabas Hylles, sons of Richard Hylles, 
citizen and merchant tailor of London, and Agnes, an 
Englishwoman 
124 
 John, Paul, Nicholas, Margaret, Katherine, and Anne 
Wheler, children of Nicholas Wheler, citizen and draper of 
London, and Margaret, his wife, daughter of Rutkyn 
Vourighe of Germany 
252 
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1563 Peter Browne, son of Thomas Browne, citizen and 
ironmonger of London, and Gertrude, his wife, daughter 
of Cornelius Vanderdelf of Brabant 
33 
 Sebastian, James, Elizabeth, and Clare Harvye, children of 
James Harvye, citizen and ironmonger of London, and 
Anne, his wife, daughter of Sebastian Ghens of Antwerp 
119 
20 
 Joyce and William Mason, children of William Mason, 
late citizen and mercer of London, and Josyn, his wife, 
daughter of John de Fisher of Brabant 
165 
 Gilbert, Susan, Richard, and Gabryel Saltonstall, children 
of Richard Saltonstall, citizen and skinner of London, and 
Susanne, his wife, daughter of Thomas Poyntz, gentleman 
214 
 Thomas Wheler, son of Nicholas Wheler, citizen and 
draper of London, and Margaret, his wife, daughter of 
Rutkyn Vourighe of Germany 
252 
1566 John Stafford, born in Geneva, son of the late Sir William 
Stafford and Lady Dorothy Stafford, daughter of Sir 
Henry Stafford, late Lord Stafford, William and Dorothy 
having fled to Geneva in the time of Queen Mary 
224 
1571 Peregrine Bertye, born in Duchy of Cleves, son of Richard 
Bertye and Lady Katherine, Duchess of Suffolk, his wife 
22 
1576 Susan and Sarah Alden, daughters of John Alden, grocer 
of London, and Barbara, his wife, daughter of Jaques du 
Prier 
3 
 Margery and Thomasyn Baker, daughters of John Baker, 
merchant of Ipswich, and Willemynkin, his wife, daughter 
of Jasper de Haes of Brabant 
12 
 William, John, and Elizabeth Barker, children of John 
Barker, merchant of Kingston upon Hull, and Barbara, his 
wife, daughter of John Johnson of Antwerp 
14 
 Joseph Caunte, born beyond the seas, son of Edward 
Caunte, fishmonger of London, and Margaret, his wife, 
both English 
44 
 Magdalin, Elizabeth, and Katerine Dodd, daughters of 
Philip Dodd, haberdasher of London, and Elizabeth, 
daughter of John Van Howte of Antwerp 
80 
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 Samuel Graye, born in parts beyond the seas, son of John 
Graye, girdler of London, and Julyan, his wife, both 
English 
110 
 Anne Harvy, born in Brabant, daughter of James Harvy, 
alderman and ironmonger of London, and Anne, his wife, 
daughter of Sebastian Ghentz of Antwerp 
119 
 Peter, James, Thomas, Melchior, and Katherine Harvie, 
children of James Harvie, ironmonger of London, and 
Barbara, daughter of Peter Charles of Antwerp 
119 
 Nathaniel Kelke, born beyond the seas, son of John Kelke, 
merchant of London, and Elizabeth, his wife, both English 
140 
 Barbara, Symond, and Margaret, children of Robert 
Kingsland, merchant, and Barbara, his wife, daughter of 
Willeberte Vann Romer of Antwerp 
142 
 Jane and Susan Knightley, daughters of George Knightley, 
leather seller of London, and Agnes, his wife, daughter of 
John Pieterson and Joan, his wife, of Zealand 
142 
 William and Katherine Massam, children of William 
Massam, grocer of London, and Gartred, his wife, 
daughter of Christofher van Eyndhaven of Antwerp 
165 
 Anne Nedeham, daughter of George Nedeham, merchant 
of London, and Clara, his wife, daughter of Martin Croyte 
of Antwerp 
178 
 Adrian, Jasper, Daniel, Lucretia, Maria, Anna, and 
Susanna Poignes, children of Robert Poignes, grocer of 
London, and Agneta, his wife, daughter of Jasper Crate of 
Zealand 
194 
 Mary, Anne, and Susan Poignes, daughters of Fernando 
Poignes, grocer of London, and Elizabeth, his wife, 
daughter of Croyne Johnson of Zealand 
194 
 Randall, Henry, and Samuel Starkye, born in Zealand, 
sons of Randall Starkye, merchant tailor of London, and 
Cornelia Oliver, daughter of Bartholomey Oliver and Jane, 
his wife, of Zealand 
225 
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 Fredinando, Thomas, Francis, Alexander, Arthur, Philip, 
Katherine, Elizabeth, and Margaret Staynton, children of 
Thomas Staynton, mercer of London, and Petronilla, his 
wife, daughter of Arthur van Scott of Antwerp 
225 
 John, Thomas, William, Magdalyn, and James Taylor, 
children of John Taylor, mercer of London, and Elizabeth, 
his wife, daughter of Martin de Hilt of Antwerp 
230 
 Walter Taylor, son of John Taylor, merchant of London, 




 William Walker, son of Thomas Walker, officer of the 
Company of Merchant Adventurers of England, and Anne, 
daughter of Leonarde Talbon of Flanders 
249 
 Gerson Whetenhall, born in Germany, son of Thomas 
Whetenhall of Kent and Dorothy, his wife, who in the 




1581 John Barthelmewe, born in parts beyond the seas, son of 
John Barthelmewe, late mercer of London, and Joyce, his 
wife, both English 
15 
 Bartilmew, Katherine, and Michael Beeston, born in 
Antwerp, and Richard Beeston, born in Hamburg, children 
of Richard Beeston, merchant of Southampton, and Mary, 
his wife, daughter of Sampson Cacioppyne of the Hague 
19 
 Walter and Susan Coppinger, born in Antwerp, children of 
Walter Coppinger, mercer, and Elizabeth, daughter of 
Cornelius Van Bright, of Antwerp 
53 
 James, Richard, Fraunces, Mary, Margaret, Abigall, and 
Gertrude Holmes, born at Hamborough, children of James 
Holmes, merchant, and Gertrude, daughter of Bonyface 
Lowther of Antwerp 
125 
 Thomas, Harman, Giles, John, Richard, and Katherine 
Hughes, born in Hamburg, children of John Hughes of 
London and Elizabeth, daughter of John Bylf of Gulicke 
127 
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 Adrian and Robert Moore, born in Antwerp, and Henry 
and Katherine Moore, born in Hamborough, children of 
Robert Moore, merchant of Southampton, and Katherine, 
his wife, daughter of Wincelowe Coberger of Antwerp 
172 
 William Watson, born at Dansk, son of Roger Watson, 
draper, and Margaret, daughter of Humfrey Carr of 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
250 
1592 Peregrine Wingfield, born in the Low Countries, son of Sir 
John Wingfield, and Dame Susan, Countess of Kent, his 
wife 
255 
1593 William Crumpe, born in Antwerp, son of William 
Crumpe, mercer of London, and Elizabeth, his wife, her 
Majesty’s subjects 
58 
 Elizabeth Knolles, born in the Low Countries, daughter of 
Sir Thomas Knolles, a natural born Englishman, and 
Odilia, his wife 
142 
 William Lytleton, born in the Low Countries, son of 
Fraunces Lytleton, a true Englishman and Captain under 
Sir William Russell, and Mary, his wife 
159 
 Samuel Saltonstall, born beyond the seas, son of Richard 
Saltonstall, citizen and alderman of London, and Susan, 
his wife, daughter of Thomas Poyntz, her Majesty’s 
faithful subject 
214 
 Danyel Scaliett, born at Antwerp, son of Mark Scaliett, 
born in London, and Joice Paschier, his wife 
216 
 Elizabeth and John Shepperd, children of Richard 
Shepperd, citizen and grocer of London, and Sara, his 
wife, daughter of Hanns Vander Hide of Hamborough 
219 
 William Sidney, born in Zealand, son of Sir Robert 
Sidney, born in Kent, and Dame Barbara, his wife, born in 
Wales 
221 
 Jane Sturtevant, born in Holland, daughter of Fraunces 
Sturtevant, grocer of London, and Phillipp [sic], daughter 
of Richard Rogers of Holland 
227 
1597 John and William Heather, born in Holland, sons of 
Richard Heather, merchant adventurer of London, and I., 
121 
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daughter of Harke Peterson of Amsterdam 
 Ottowell Hill, born in Antwerp, son of Richard Hill, 
merchant of London, and Elizabeth, his wife, daughter of 
Sir William Locke, citizen of London 
124 
 William Lewkenor, born in Antwerp, son of Lewis 
Lewkenor, esquire to the Queen’s body, and B., daughter 
of Joyce de Rottes of Antwerp 
154 
 George Sheppey, born in Antwerp, son of George 
Sheppey, a damasker of London, and Mary, his wife, 
daughter of Jobb Josse of Antwerp 
219 
 Helen Waters, born in parts beyond the seas in the time of 
Queen Mary, daughter of John Waters and Gertrude, his 
wife, late of Great Yarmouth 
250 
1601 Thomas Moxsen, born in Antwerp, son of William 
Moxsen, late merchant and adventurer of Yorkshire, and 




Part II: 16031700 
 
Source: HUGUENOT SOCIETY OF LONDON, LETTERS OF DENIZATION AND ACTS 
OF NATURALIZATION FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND, 16031700 
(William A. Shaw ed., 1911). Page numbers in the following table refer to this 
book. 
 
Year Children Naturalized by Parliament Page 
1604 Margaret, Countess of Nottingham, born in Scotland, wife 
of Charles, Earl of Nottingham, and all her children, 
wherever she was or they shall be born 
2 
 John Gordon, born in Scotland, grandson of George 
Gordon, Earl of Huntley 
4 
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 Thomas Glover, born in Livonia, son of Thomas Glover 
of Warwickshire and Theodora, his wife, stranger born; 
Francys Collymore, born in Antwerp, son of Robert 
Collymore, citizen and merchant of London, and Mary, 
his wife, stranger born; Alexander Danyell, born in 
Zealand, son of Richard Danyell, citizen and merchant of 
London, and Jaquelina, his wife, stranger born; Nicholas 
Gilpine, born in Emden, son of Richard Gilpine, citizen 
and draper of London, and Susan, his wife; Mary Copcott, 
born in Zealand, daughter of Reynold Copcott, citizen and 
ironmonger of London, and Jaquelina, his wife, stranger 
born 
45 
 Katheryne, Elizabeth, Susan, Hester, and Mary Vincent, 
born in Embden and Stoad, children of William Vincent, 
merchant of London, and Blanch, his wife 
5 
1607 Fabian Smith, born in Livonia, son of George Smith, an 
English merchant, and Anne, his wife, a Dutchwoman 
10 
 John Ramsden, born in Antwerp, son of Roger Ramsden, 
an English merchant 
10 
1610 Michael Boyle, born in Zealand, son of James Boyle, 
citizen and mercer of London 
14 
 Richard, John, and Robert Bladwell, born in Germany, 
children of John Bladwell, an Englishman; George and 
John Hasden, born in Germany, sons of John Hasden, an 
English merchant, and Marten, his wife, born in Germany; 
and Elizabeth and Ann Cradock, born in Germany, 
daughters of William Cradock, an Englishman 
15 
 Joane Greenesmith, born in East Frisland, daughter of 
Mathew Greenesmith, citizen and grocer of London, and 
Teake,  his wife, born in East Frisland 
15 
 Margaret Clarke, born in Poland, daughter of John 
Langton, an English merchant, and Elizabeth, his wife, an 
Englishwoman 
15 
1624 Elizabeth and Mary Vere, born in The Hague, daughters 
of Sir Horace Vere, born in Essex, and Dame Mary, his 
wife, born in Gloucestershire 
34 
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1628 Isaac (age 15), Henry (age 14), Thomas (age 12), and 
Barnard (age 11) Asteley, born in Holland, children of Sir 
Jacob Asteley, one of the younger sons of Isaac Asteley, 
late of Norfolk, and Dame Agneta, his wife, born in 
Holland 
40 
 Samuel Powell (age 4), born in Hamburg, son of John 
Powell, merchant of London, born in Shropshire, and 
Jane, his wife, daughter of Thomas Dockwra of 
Hertfordshire 
40 
 John (age 16) and Anne (age 12) Trumball, born in 
Brussels, children of William Trumball, one of the clerks 
of your Majesty’s Privy Council, and Deborah, his wife, 
an Englishwoman; William (age 18), Edward (age 16), 
and Sidney (age 14) Bere, born in Zealand, children of 
John Bere, born in Kent, and Elizabeth, his wife, daughter 
of Peter Warburton of Chester; and Samuell Wentworth 
(age 8),  born in Calais, son of William Wentworth, 
merchant of Kent, and his wife, an Englishwoman 
40 
 John, Marie, Anne, Elizabeth, and Margarett Aldersey, 
born in Germany, children of Samuell Aldersey of 
London and Marie, his late wife, daughter of Phillipp 
Vanoyrlle of Germany 
41 
 James Freese (age 25), born in Russia, son of John Freese, 
an Englishman 
41 
1641 Dorothy Spencer, daughter of Lord Spencer of 
Whormeleighton 
60 
1657 Sarah Crewes, born in Rotterdam, daughter of Mathew 
Crewes, late of Norfolk, and Elizabeth, his wife, to be 
added to this bill 
73 
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1660 Frances and James Hyde, born in the Netherlands and 
Belgium respectively, children of the Right Hon. Edward 
Lord Hyde; Charles, Charlotte, and Isabella Gerrard, born 
in Paris, children of the Right Hon. Charles Lord Gerrard 
of Brandon; Symon Fanshaw, born in Brittany, son of Sir 
Thomas Fanshawe of Hertfordshire; Richard and John 
Hamilton, born in Normandy, children of Sir George 
Hamilton; Edward and Ann Bedell, born in Gilderland, 
children of William Bedell, late of Huntingdonshire; 
Thomas Crispe, born in the Netherlands, son of Thomas 
Crispe of Kent; and Symon Clerke, born in Flanders, son 
of Peter Clerke of Warwickshire 
7577 
 Lawrence Blancart, born in Calais, son of Lawrence 
Blancart, late of Kent; William Hanmer, born in France, 
son of Sir Thomas Hanmer of Flintshire; Elias Brooke, 
born in Zealand, son of English parents; and Constant, 
Nathaniell, Joshua, and Giles Sylvester and Mary 
Cartwright, born in Amsterdam, children of Giles 
Sylvester and Mary, his wife, English parents 
7879 
1661 Francis Brudenell and Anna Maria, Countess of 
Shrewsbury, born in France, children of the Right Hon. 
Robert Lord Brudenell 
80 
1662 John Scase, born in Amsterdam, son of Edward Scase of 
Suffolk and Miriam, his wife, born in Hampshire; Mathew 
Boucheret, born in France, son of Gedeon Boucheret of 
Sussex and Jane, his wife; Bartholomew Lane, born in 
France, son of Samuell Lane, born in London, and Susan, 
his wife; Charles Hales, born in Antwerp, third son of Sir 
Edward Hales of Kent; William Northey, an infant, born 
in Holland, son of William Northey of London; and John, 
Richard, and Thomas Hebdon, born in Russia, sons of 
John Hebdon, a natural Englishman 
8182 
1664 Daniell van Peene, born in Zealand, son of Jacob van 
Peene, an Englishman; and Robert Hall, born in The 
Hague, son of Robert Hall of Kent and Elizabeth, his wife 
9495 
1696 Dorothy Gee (age 7), born in Holland, son of William Gee 
of York and Elizabeth, his wife 
239 
1698 Dudley Vesey (under age 14), born in Rouen, son of 
Charles Vesey of Suffolk and Frances, his wife 
251 
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 Charles May, born out of your Majesty’s allegiance, of 
English parents 
251 
1699 Francis Best, born in Switzerland, son of Henry Best and 




Part III: 17011800 
 
Source: HUGUENOT SOCIETY OF LONDON, LETTERS OF DENIZATION AND ACTS 
OF NATURALIZATION FOR ALIENS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND, 17011800 
(William A. Shaw ed., 1923). Page numbers in the following table refer to this 
book. 
 
Year Children Naturalized by Parliament Page 
1701 Archibald Arthur, born out of the king’s allegiance, of 
English parents 
1 
 Charlotte Boscawen, born in Paris, daughter of Charles 
Godfrey, Esq., and Arabella, his wife 
11 
1705 William Burnet (under age 21), born in The Hague, son of 
Gilbert Lord Bishop of Salisbury and Mary Scott, his wife 
45 
1706 Mary Elizabeth Braithwait, born in Holland, daughter of 
Sir Roger Manley and Mary Catherine, his wife; and Jane 
Jeffreys, born in Sweden, daughter of Sir James Jeffreys, 
by Anna, his wife 
47 
 Paul, Frances, and Catherine Risley, born in Holland, 
children of Capt. Henry Risley, late of Buckinghamshire, 
and Elizabeth Duncombe, his wife 
48 
1708 Katherine Clerke, born in Paris, daughter of Sir William 
Clerke, late of Buckinghamshire, and Dame Katherine, his 
wife, born in Paris 
61 
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 An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 7 Anne, ch. 
5, the first of the general naturalization statutes, went into 
effect in 1708. Not surprisingly, naturalizations of 
children born abroad to English subjects dropped off. 
There still seem to be some, however. This volume does 
not give as many details as the previous one, so I cannot 
be certain. Below are several examples of cases that may 
have involved English parents. 
 
1745 Dorothy Penton, born in Lisbon, daughter of Christian 




Francis Popham, born in France, son of Francis Popham 
and Martha Clarke 
184 
1792 Richard Walker, born in Bengal 196 
 James Mainwaring (age 4), born in France before his 
parents’ marriage, son of James Mainwaring of Cheshire 
and Anne Marie Mainwaring, born in Switzerland 
197 
1796 Robert (age 18), John (age 17), and Mary (age 15) 
Howard, born in India, requested by the Rev. Nicholas 
Isaac Hill of Middlesex, their guardian 
204 
 
*When more than one date is indicated, only the latest is noted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
